Faculty Bibliography

This paper is the third in a series of investigations into (1) the nature and development of unconscious fantasy, (2) its place in a contemporary model of mind that, parenthetically, suggests a possible solution to the problem of theoretical pluralism, and (3) its mode of operation in the mind. The aim of these investigations is to update the notion of unconscious fantasy, an indispensable construct in psychoanalytic theories that assume out-of-awareness mentation, and to situate that construct within contemporary views of mental functioning in disciplines such as philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and developmental psychology. At the same time, data accessible only through psychoanalytic work challenge these fields with findings that indicate the need for further investigation. This paper argues that experimental evidence on the phenomenon of "priming" lends support to one of the seminal claims in our field, one frequently attacked as an outmoded shibboleth: that is, that the past matters, whether encoded in declarative or in procedural memory. In common parlance, we are "primed" to respond to some situations in predetermined ways; the past primes us to experience the present in often unique and personal ways. There is evidence too that the priming mechanism and the encoding of subjective experience in declarative and procedural memory operate from very early in life.

Philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists have proposed that "mind" consists of myriad mental representations, namely, conscious and unconscious representations of belief/desire intentions. It is argued here that unconscious fantasies constitute a subset of the domain of mental representations, those concerned with conflicting wishes, affects, and defensive maneuvers. This proposal anchors the unconscious fantasy construct in a model of mind that accords with contemporary academic views in cognitive and developmental psychology and philosophy of mind, thus allowing psychoanalysts to enter into dialogue with those disciplines. Given this formulation, unconscious fantasy might well serve as a theoretical construct that applies to a large group of theories that share certain criteria regarding mentation. An analyst would then be at liberty to commingle insights from a menu of different theories without committing metatheoretical malpractice, resulting in a principled version of theoretical pluralism. Published case material from Kleinian, close process monitoring, and self psychological perspectives demonstrates how this redefined unconscious fantasy construct can encompass two major types of interventions that analysts make: content and process interpretations.

Philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists have proposed that "mind" consists of myriad mental representations, namely, conscious and unconscious representations of belief/desire intentions. It is argued here that unconscious fantasies constitute a subset of the domain of mental representations, those concerned with conflicting wishes, affects, and defensive maneuvers. This proposal anchors the unconscious fantasy construct in a model of mind that accords with contemporary academic views in cognitive and developmental psychology and philosophy of mind, thus allowing psychoanalysts to enter into dialogue with those disciplines. Given this formulation, unconscious fantasy might well serve as a theoretical construct that applies to a large group of theories that share certain criteria regarding mentation. An analyst would then be at liberty to commingle insights from a menu of different theories without committing metatheoretical malpractice, resulting in a principled version of theoretical pluralism. Published case material from Kleinian, close process monitoring, and self psychological perspectives demonstrates how this redefined unconscious fantasy construct can encompass two major types of interventions that analysts make: content and process interpretations.

The concepts of oedipal guilt, survivor guilt, and separation guilt are examined using clinical material from a child case to demonstrate the intermingling of these constructs. A brief review of their evolution in the psychoanalytic literature reveals a frequent conflation of the terms guilt and fear, the former at times standing in for both meanings. The fear/guilt distinction and the subsequent differentiation of guilt into oedipal, survivor, and separation guilt have implications for how analysts understand and interpret particular kinds of clinical material. Two sets of adult clinical data are next presented: the first illustrates a shift from interpreting a patient's fear of retribution for forbidden desires to interpreting guilt over pursuing those desires. The second vignette illustrates a common dynamic in which a patient's fear/anxiety regarding the ability to lead an independent life defends against deeper feelings of guilt over this same desire. This latter dynamic can play an important role in negative therapeutic reactions and interminable analyses. Developmental research suggests that toward the end of the first year of life, infants' capacity to attribute independent mental states and intentionality to self and others allows for the rudimentary experience of guilt