Faculty Bibliography

In a dynamic environment, sources of threat or safety can unexpectedly change, requiring the flexible updating of stimulus-outcome associations that promote adaptive behavior. However, aversive contexts in which we are required to update predictions of threat are often marked by stress. Acute stress is thought to reduce behavioral flexibility, yet its influence on the modulation of aversive value has not been well characterized. Given that stress exposure is a prominent risk factor for anxiety and trauma-related disorders marked by persistent, inflexible responses to threat, here we examined how acute stress affects the flexible updating of threat responses. Participants completed an aversive learning task, in which one stimulus was probabilistically associated with an electric shock, while the other stimulus signaled safety. A day later, participants underwent an acute stress or control manipulation before completing a reversal learning task during which the original stimulus-outcome contingencies switched. Skin conductance and neuroendocrine responses provided indices of sympathetic arousal and stress responses, respectively. Despite equivalent initial learning, stressed participants showed marked impairments in reversal learning relative to controls. Additionally, reversal learning deficits across participants were related to heightened levels of alpha-amylase, a marker of noradrenergic activity. Finally, fitting arousal data to a computational reinforcement learning model revealed that stress-induced reversal learning deficits emerged from stress-specific changes in the weight assigned to prediction error signals, disrupting the adaptive adjustment of learning rates. Our findings provide insight into how stress renders individuals less sensitive to changes in aversive reinforcement and have implications for understanding clinical conditions marked by stress-related psychopathology.

The ubiquitous and intense nature of stress responses necessitate that we understand how they affect decision-making. Despite a number of studies examining risky decision-making under stress, it is as yet unclear whether and in what way stress alters the underlying processes that shape our choices. This is in part because previous studies have not separated and quantified dissociable valuation and decision-making processes that can affect choices of risky options, including risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency, among others. Here, in a large, fully-crossed two-day within-subjects design, we examined how acute stress alters risky decision-making. On each day, 120 participants completed either the cold pressor test or a control manipulation with equal probability, followed by a risky decision-making task. Stress responses were assessed with salivary cortisol. We fit an econometric model to choices that dissociated risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency using hierarchical Bayesian techniques to both pool data and allow heterogeneity in decision-making. Acute stress was found to have no effect on risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice consistency, though participants did become more loss averse and more consistent on the second day relative to the first. In the context of an inconsistent previous literature on risk and acute stress, our findings provide strong and specific evidence that acute stress does not affect risk attitudes, loss aversion, or consistency in risky monetary decision-making.

Uncertainty preferences are typically studied in neutral, nonsocial contexts. This approach, however, fails to capture the dynamic factors that influence choices under uncertainty in the real world. Our goal was twofold: to test whether uncertainty valuation is similar across social and nonsocial contexts, and to investigate the effects of acute stress on uncertainty preferences. Subjects completed matched gambling and trust games following either a control or a stress manipulation. Those who were not under stress exhibited no differences between the amount of money gambled and the amount of money entrusted to partners. In comparison, stressed subjects gambled more money but entrusted less money to partners. We further found that irrespective of stress, subjects were highly attuned to irrelevant feedback in the nonsocial, gambling context, believing that every loss led to a greater chance of winning (the gamblers' fallacy). However, when deciding to trust a stranger, control subjects behaved rationally, treating each new interaction as independent. Stress compromised this adaptive behavior, increasing sensitivity to irrelevant social feedback.

Fear learning and regulation is as a prominent model for describing the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders and stress-related psychopathology. Fear expression can be modulated using a number of regulatory strategies, including extinction, cognitive emotion regulation, avoidance strategies and reconsolidation. In this review, we examine research investigating the effects of acute stress and stress hormones on these regulatory techniques. We focus on what is known about the impact of stress on the ability to flexibly regulate fear responses that are acquired through Pavlovian fear conditioning. Our primary aim is to explore the impact of stress on fear regulation in humans. Given this, we focus on techniques where stress has been linked to alterations of fear regulation in humans (extinction and emotion regulation), and briefly discuss other techniques (avoidance and reconsolidation) where the impact of stress or stress hormones have been mainly explored in animal models. These investigations reveal that acute stress may impair the persistent inhibition of fear, presumably by altering prefrontal cortex function. Characterizing the effects of stress on fear regulation is critical for understanding the boundaries within which existing regulation strategies are viable in everyday life and can better inform treatment options for those who suffer from anxiety and stress-related psychopathology.

When determining the cause of a person's behavior, perceivers often overweigh dispositional explanations and underweigh situational explanations, an error known as the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). The FAE occurs in part because dispositional explanations are relatively automatic, whereas considering the situation requires additional cognitive effort. Stress is known to impair the prefrontal cortex and executive functions important for the attribution process. We investigated if stress increases dispositional attributions in common place and legal situations. Experiencing a physiological stressor increased participants' cortisol, dispositional attributions of common everyday behaviors, and negative evaluations. When determining whether a crime was due to the defendant's disposition or the mitigating situation, self-reported stress correlated with increased dispositional judgments of defendant's behavior. These findings indicate that stress may make people more likely to commit the FAE and less favorable in their evaluations of others both in daily life and when making socially consequential judicial decisions.

Extinction training is a form of inhibitory learning that allows an organism to associate a previously aversive cue with a new, safe outcome. Extinction does not erase a fear association, but instead creates a competing association that may or may not be retrieved when a cue is subsequently encountered. Characterizing the conditions under which extinction learning is expressed is important to enhancing the treatment of anxiety disorders that rely on extinction-based exposure therapy as a primary treatment technique. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which plays a critical role in the expression of extinction memory, has been shown to be functionally impaired after stress exposure. Further, recent work in rodents has demonstrated that exposure to stress leads to deficits in extinction retrieval, although this has yet to be tested in humans. To explore how stress might influence extinction retrieval in humans, participants underwent a differential aversive learning paradigm, in which one image was probabilistically paired with an aversive shock while the other image denoted safety. Extinction training directly followed, at which point reinforcement was omitted. A day later, participants returned to the lab and either completed an acute stress manipulation (i.e., cold pressor), or a control task, before undergoing an extinction retrieval test. Skin conductance responses and salivary cortisol concentrations were measured throughout each session as indices of fear arousal and neuroendocrine stress response, respectively. The efficacy of our stress induction was established by observing significant increases in cortisol for the stress condition only. We examined extinction retrieval by comparing conditioned responses during the last trial of extinction (day 1) with that of the first trial of re-extinction (day 2). Groups did not differ on initial fear acquisition or extinction, however, a day later participants in the stress group (n=27) demonstrated significantly lower extinction retrieval (i.e., greater fear recovery) than those in the control group (n=25). Our results suggest that acute stress impairs the retrieval of extinction learning and offers insight into why treatment strategies used in the clinic may be challenging to recruit in daily life where stress is pervasive.

Extinction training during reconsolidation has been shown to persistently diminish conditioned fear responses across species. We investigated in humans if older fear memories can benefit similarly. Using a Pavlovian fear conditioning paradigm we compared standard extinction and extinction after memory reactivation 1 d or 7 d following acquisition. Participants who underwent extinction during reconsolidation showed no evidence of fear recovery, whereas fear responses returned in participants who underwent standard extinction. We observed this effect in young and old fear memories. Extending the beneficial use of reconsolidation to older fear memories in humans is promising for therapeutic applications.

Accounts of decision-making have long posited the operation of separate, competing valuation systems in the control of choice behavior. Recent theoretical and experimental advances suggest that this classic distinction between habitual and goal-directed (or more generally, automatic and controlled) choice may arise from two computational strategies for reinforcement learning, called model-free and model-based learning. Popular neurocomputational accounts of reward processing emphasize the involvement of the dopaminergic system in model-free learning and prefrontal, central executive-dependent control systems in model-based choice. Here we hypothesized that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis stress response--believed to have detrimental effects on prefrontal cortex function--should selectively attenuate model-based contributions to behavior. To test this, we paired an acute stressor with a sequential decision-making task that affords distinguishing the relative contributions of the two learning strategies. We assessed baseline working-memory (WM) capacity and used salivary cortisol levels to measure HPA axis stress response. We found that stress response attenuates the contribution of model-based, but not model-free, contributions to behavior. Moreover, stress-induced behavioral changes were modulated by individual WM capacity, such that low-WM-capacity individuals were more susceptible to detrimental stress effects than high-WM-capacity individuals. These results enrich existing accounts of the interplay between acute stress, working memory, and prefrontal function and suggest that executive function may be protective against the deleterious effects of acute stress.