Faculty Bibliography

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector's long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned a billing code, even if they do little to help patients. Instead of further entrenching weakly competitive parties engaged in artificial commerce, antitrust enforcers and regulators should work together to promote the sale of fully assembled products and services that can be warranted to consumers for performance and safety. As better products emerge through innovation and market entry, competition may finally succeed at lowering medical costs, increasing access to treatment, and improving quality of care.

IMPORTANCE/OBJECTIVE:Honesty and transparency are essential aspects of health care, including in physicians' and hospitals' responses to medical error. Biases and habits associated with medical malpractice litigation, however, may work at cross-purposes with compassion in clinical care and with efforts to improve patient safety. OBJECTIVE:To determine the frequency of nondisclosure agreements in medical malpractice settlements and the extent to which the restrictions in these agreements seem incompatible with good patient care. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS/METHODS:We performed a retrospective review of medical malpractice claim files, including settlement agreements, for claims closed before (fiscal year 2001-2002), during (fiscal year 2006-2007), and after (fiscal years 2009-2012) the implementation of tort reform in Texas. We studied The University of Texas System, which self-insures malpractice claims that involve 6000 physicians at 6 medical campuses in 5 cities. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES/METHODS:Nondisclosure provisions in medical malpractice settlements. RESULTS:During the 5 study years, The University of Texas System closed 715 malpractice claims and made 150 settlement payments. For the 124 cases that met our selection criteria, the median compensation paid by the university was $100,000 (range, $500-$1.25 million), and the mean compensation was $185,372. A total of 110 settlement agreements (88.7%) included nondisclosure provisions. All the nondisclosure clauses prohibited disclosure of the settlement terms and amount, 61 (55.5%) prohibited disclosure that the settlement had been reached, 51 (46.4%) prohibited disclosure of the facts of the claim, 29 (26.4%) prohibited reporting to regulatory agencies, and 10 (9.1%) prohibited disclosure by the settling physicians and hospitals, not only by the claimant. Three agreements (2.7%) included specific language that prohibited the claimant from disparaging the physicians or hospitals. The 50 settlement agreements signed after tort reform took full effect in Texas (2009-2012) had stricter nondisclosure provisions than the 60 signed in earlier years: settlements after tort reform were more likely to prohibit disclosure of the event of settlement (36 [72.0%] vs 25 [41.7%]; P < .001), to prohibit disclosure of the facts of the claims (31 [62.0%] vs 20 [33.3%]; P = .003), and to prohibit reporting to regulatory bodies (25 [50.0%] vs 4 [6.7%]; P < .001). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE/CONCLUSIONS:An academic health system with a declared commitment to patient safety and transparency used nondisclosure clauses in most malpractice settlement agreements but with little standardization or consistency. The scope of nondisclosure was often broader than seemed needed to protect physicians and hospitals from disparagement by the plaintiff or to avoid publicizing settlement amounts that might attract other claimants. Some agreements prohibited reporting to regulatory agencies, a practice that the health system changed in response to our findings.

As hospital, physician, and health insurance markets consolidate and change in response to health care reform, some commentators have called for vigorous enforcement of the federal antitrust laws to prevent the acquisition and exercise of market power. In health care, however, stricter antitrust enforcement will benefit consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector's long history of government regulation. This article directs policy makers to a neglected dimension of health care competition that has been altered by regulation: the product. Competition may have failed to significantly lower costs, increase access, or improve quality in health care because we have been buying and selling the wrong things. Competition policy makers-meaning both antitrust enforcers and regulators-should force the health care industry to define and market products that can be assembled and warranted to consumers while keeping emerging sectors such as mHealth free from overregulation, wasteful subsidy, and appropriation by established insurer and provider interests.

Communication-and-resolution programs (CRPs) in health care organizations seek to identify medical injuries promptly; ensure that they are disclosed to patients compassionately; pursue timely resolution through patient engagement, explanation, and, where appropriate, apology and compensation; and use lessons learned to improve patient safety. CRPs have existed for years, but they are being tested in new settings and primed for broad implementation through grants from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. These projects do not require changing laws. However, grantees' experiences suggest that the path to successful dissemination of CRPs would be smoother if the legal environment supported them. State and federal policy makers should try to allay potential defendants' fears of litigation (for example, by protecting apologies from use in court), facilitate patient participation (for example, by ensuring access to legal representation), and address the reputational and economic concerns of health care providers (for example, by clarifying practices governing National Practitioner Data Bank reporting and payers' financial recourse following medical error).

The study of adverse event disclosure has typically focused on the words that are said to the patient and family members after an event. But there is also growing interest in determining how patients and their families can be involved in the analysis of the adverse events that harmed them. We conducted a two-phase study to understand whether patients and families who have experienced an adverse event should be involved in the postevent analysis following the disclosure of a medical error. We first conducted twenty-eight interviews with patients, family members, clinicians, and administrators to determine the extent to which patients and family members are included in event analysis processes and to learn how their experiences might be improved. Then we reviewed our interview findings with patients and health care experts at a one-day national conference in October 2011. After evaluating the findings, conference participants concluded that increasing the involvement of patients and their families in the event analysis process was desirable but needed to be structured in a patient-centered way to be successful. We conclude by describing when and how information from patients might be incorporated into the event analysis process and by offering recommendations on how this might be accomplished.

Physician leadership is required to improve the efficiency and reliability of the US health care system, but many physicians remain lukewarm about the changes needed to attain these goals. Malpractice liability-a sore spot for decades-may exacerbate physician resistance. The politics of malpractice have become so lawyer-centric that recognizing the availability of broader gains from trade in tort reform is an important insight for health policy makers. To obtain relief from malpractice liability, physicians may be willing to accept other policy changes that more directly improve access to care and reduce costs. For example, the American Medical Association might broker an agreement between health reform proponents and physicians to enact federal legislation that limits malpractice liability and simultaneously restructures fee-for-service payment, heightens transparency regarding the quality and cost of health care services, and expands practice privileges for other health professionals. There are also reasons to believe that tort reform can make ongoing health care delivery reforms work better, in addition to buttressing health reform efforts that might otherwise fail politically.

For the first time, entrepreneurs are aggressively developing new technologies and business models designed to improve individual and population health, not just to deliver specialized medical care. Consumers of these goods and services are not yet "patients"; they are simply people. As this sector of the health care industry expands, it is likely to require new forms of legal governance, which we term "upstream health law."