Faculty Bibliography

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission occurred among patients visiting a physician's office and to evaluate potential transmission mechanisms. DESIGN: Serologic survey, retrospective cohort study, and observation of infection control practices. SETTING: Private medical office. PATIENTS: Those visiting the office between March 1 and December 26, 2001. RESULTS: We identified 38 patients with acute HBV infection occurring between February 2000 and February 2002. The cohort study, limited to the 10 months before outbreak detection, included 91 patients with serologic test results and available charts representing 18 case-patients and 73 susceptible patients. Overall, 67 patients (74%) received at least one injection during the observation period. Case-patients received a median of 14 injections (range, 2-25) versus 2 injections (range, 0-17) for susceptible patients (P < .001). Acute infections occurred among 18 (27%) of 67 who received at least one injection versus none of 24 who received no injections (RR, 13.6; CI95, 2.4-undefined). Risk of infection increased 5.2-fold (CI95, 0.6-47.3) for those with 3 to 6 injections and 20.0-fold (CI95, 2.8-143.5) for those with more than 6 injections. Typically, injections consisted of doses of atropine, dexamethasone, vitamin B12, or a combination of these mixed in one syringe. HBV DNA genetic sequences of 24 patients with acute infection and 4 patients with chronic infection were identical in the 1,500-bp region examined. Medical staff were seronegative for HBV infection markers. The same surface was used for storing multidose vials, preparing injections, and dismantling used injection equipment. CONCLUSION: Administration of unnecessary injections combined with failure to separate clean from contaminated areas and follow safe injection practices likely resulted in patient-to-patient HBV transmission in a private physician's office

BACKGROUND: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, New York, prompted an unprecedented rescue and recovery response. Operations were conducted around the clock, involved over 5000 workers per day, and extended into months following the attacks. The City of New York Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention implemented prospective surveillance to characterize rescue worker-related injury and illness and to help guide public health interventions. METHODS: From September 11 to October 11, 2001, personnel reviewed medical records at four Manhattan hospital emergency departments (EDs), and healthcare providers completed data collection forms at five temporary Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) facilities located at the site. Rescue workers included construction workers, police officers, firefighters, emergency medical service technicians, or Urban Search and Rescue workers. Data collected included demographic characteristics, injury type, illness, and disposition. RESULTS: Of 5222 rescue worker visits, 89% were to DMAT facilities and 12% to EDs. Musculoskeletal conditions were the leading cause of visits (19%), followed by respiratory (16%) and eye (13%) disorders. Incidence rates were estimated based on total injuries and/or illnesses reported times 200,000 (100 equivalent full-time workers in 1 year at 40 hours per week x 50 weeks per year), then divided by the total number of hours worked. Eye disorders (59.7) accounted for the highest estimated injury and illness rate, followed by headache (46.8). One death, 52 hospital admissions, and 55 transports were reported. Findings underscored the need to coordinate distribution and enforcement of personal protective equipment use, purchase of diagnostic equipment to diagnose corneal abrasions, and distribution of health advisories. CONCLUSIONS: This system provided objective, timely information that helped guide public health interventions in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and during the prolonged rescue and recovery operations. Lessons learned can be used to guide future surveillance efforts

In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facilities, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty (91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law enforcement communities

Nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM) are ubiquitous in the environment and cause colonization, infection, and pseudo-outbreaks in health care settings. Data suggest that the frequency of nosocomial outbreaks due to NTM may be increasing, and reduced hot water temperatures may be partly responsible for this phenomenon. Attention to adequate high-level disinfection of medical devices and the use of sterile reagents and biologicals will prevent most outbreaks. Because NTM cannot be eliminated from the hospital environment, and because they present an ongoing potential for infection, NTM should be considered in all cases of nosocomial infection, and careful surveillance must be used to identify potential outbreaks. Analysis of the species of NTM and the specimen source may assist in determining the significance of a cluster of isolates. Once an outbreak or pseudo-outbreak is suspected, molecular techniques should be applied promptly to determine the source and identify appropriate control measures

Outbreaks of West Nile (WN) virus occurred in the New York metropolitan area in 1999 and 2000. Nineteen patients diagnosed with WN infection were hospitalized in New York and New Jersey in 2000 and were included in this review. Eleven patients had encephalitis or meningoencephalitis, and eight had meningitis alone. Ages of patients ranged from 36 to 87 years (median 63 years). Fever and neurologic and gastrointestinal symptoms predominated. Severe muscle weakness on neurologic examination was found in three patients. Age was associated with disease severity. Hospitalized cases and deaths were lower in 2000 than in 1999, although the case-fatality rate was unchanged. Clinicians in the Northeast should maintain a high level of suspicion during the summer when evaluating older patients with febrile illnesses and neurologic symptoms, especially if associated with gastrointestinal complaints or muscle weakness