Faculty Bibliography

Individual differences in perception are widespread. Considering inter-individual variability, synesthetes experience stable additional sensations; schizophrenia patients suffer perceptual deficits in, eg, perceptual organization (alongside hallucinations and delusions). Is there a unifying principle explaining inter-individual variability in perception? There is good reason to believe perceptual experience results from inferential processes whereby sensory evidence is weighted by prior knowledge about the world. Perceptual variability may result from different precision weighting of sensory evidence and prior knowledge. We tested this hypothesis by comparing visibility thresholds in a perceptual hysteresis task across medicated schizophrenia patients (N = 20), synesthetes (N = 20), and controls (N = 26). Participants rated the subjective visibility of stimuli embedded in noise while we parametrically manipulated the availability of sensory evidence. Additionally, precise long-term priors in synesthetes were leveraged by presenting either synesthesia-inducing or neutral stimuli. Schizophrenia patients showed increased visibility thresholds, consistent with overreliance on sensory evidence. In contrast, synesthetes exhibited lowered thresholds exclusively for synesthesia-inducing stimuli suggesting high-precision long-term priors. Additionally, in both synesthetes and schizophrenia patients explicit, short-term priors-introduced during the hysteresis experiment-lowered thresholds but did not normalize perception. Our results imply that perceptual variability might result from differences in the precision afforded to prior beliefs and sensory evidence, respectively.

OBJECTIVE:Patients with traumatic brain injury who fail to obey commands after sedation-washout pose one of the most significant challenges for neurological prognostication. Reducing prognostic uncertainty will lead to more appropriate care decisions and ensure provision of limited rehabilitation resources to those most likely to benefit. Bedside markers of covert residual cognition, including speech comprehension, may reduce this uncertainty. METHODS:We recruited 28 patients with acute traumatic brain injury who were 2 to 7 days sedation-free and failed to obey commands. Patients heard streams of isochronous monosyllabic words that built meaningful phrases and sentences while their brain activity via electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. In healthy individuals, EEG activity only synchronizes with the rhythm of phrases and sentences when listeners consciously comprehend the speech. This approach therefore provides a measure of residual speech comprehension in unresponsive patients. RESULTS:Seventeen and 16 patients were available for assessment with the Glasgow Outcome Scale Extended (GOSE) at 3 months and 6 months, respectively. Outcome significantly correlated with the strength of patients' acute cortical tracking of phrases and sentences (r > 0.6, p < 0.007), quantified by inter-trial phase coherence. Linear regressions revealed that the strength of this comprehension response (beta = 0.603, p = 0.006) significantly improved the accuracy of prognoses relative to clinical characteristics alone (eg, Glasgow Coma Scale [GCS], computed tomography [CT] grade). INTERPRETATION/CONCLUSIONS:A simple, passive, auditory EEG protocol improves prognostic accuracy in a critical period of clinical decision making. Unlike other approaches to probing covert cognition for prognostication, this approach is entirely passive and therefore less susceptible to cognitive deficits, increasing the number of patients who may benefit. ANN NEUROL 2021.

Sensory input arrives in continuous sequences that humans experience as segmented units, e.g., words and events. The brain's ability to discover regularities is called statistical learning. Structure can be represented at multiple levels, including transitional probabilities, ordinal position, and identity of units. To investigate sequence encoding in cortex and hippocampus, we recorded from intracranial electrodes in human subjects as they were exposed to auditory and visual sequences containing temporal regularities. We find neural tracking of regularities within minutes, with characteristic profiles across brain areas. Early processing tracked lower-level features (e.g., syllables) and learned units (e.g., words), while later processing tracked only learned units. Learning rapidly shaped neural representations, with a gradient of complexity from early brain areas encoding transitional probability, to associative regions and hippocampus encoding ordinal position and identity of units. These findings indicate the existence of multiple, parallel computational systems for sequence learning across hierarchically organized cortico-hippocampal circuits.

Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research.

Recently, Vesuna et al. proposed a novel circuit mechanism underlying dissociative states using optogenetics and pharmacology in mice in combination with intracranial recordings and electrical stimulation in an epilepsy patient. Specifically, the authors identified a posteromedial cortical delta-rhythm that underlies states of dissociation. In the following, we would like to critically review these findings in the context of the human literature on dissociation as well as highlight the challenges in translational neuroscience to link complex behavioral phenotypes in psychiatric syndromes to circumscribed circuit mechanisms.

Value-based decisions about alternatives we have never experienced can be guided by associations between current choice options and memories of prior reward. A critical question is how similar memories need to be to the current situation to effectively guide decisions. We address this question in the context of associative learning of faces using a sensory preconditioning paradigm. We find that memories of reward spread along established associations between faces to guide decision making. While memory guidance is specific for associated facial identities, it does not only occur for the specific images that were originally encountered. Instead, memory guidance generalizes across different images of the associated identities. This suggests that memory guidance does not rely on a pictorial format of representation but on a higher, view-invariant level of abstraction. Thus, memory guidance operates on a level of representation that neither over- nor underspecifies associative relationships in the context of obtaining reward.

We typically misestimate the dimensions of our body e.g., we perceive our fingers as shorter, and our torso as more elongated, than they actually are. It stands to reason that those metric biases may also extend to objects that we interact with, to facilitate attunement with the environment. To explore this hypothesis, we compared the metric representations of seven objects and the subjects' own hand using the Line Length Judgment task, in six experiments involving 152 healthy subjects. We evaluated the size estimation errors made for each target (hand or previously observed objects) by asking subjects to compare the vertical or horizontal dimension of a specific target against the length of a vertical or horizontal line. As expected, we showed that the hand is misperceived in its dimensions. Interestingly, we found that metric biases are also present for daily-life objects, such as a mobile phone and a coffee mug, and are not affected by familiarity with the objects. In contrast, objects that are less likely to be manipulated, either because they are potentially harmful or disgusting, were differently represented. Furthermore, the propensity to interact with an object, rated by an independent sample of subjects, best predicted the pattern of metric biases associated with that object. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that biases affecting the hand representation extend to objects that elicit action-oriented behavior, highlighting the importance of studying the body as integrated and active in the environment.

High frequency oscillations (HFOs) are bursts of neural activity in the range of 80 Hz or higher, recorded from intracranial electrodes during epileptiform discharges. HFOs are a proposed biomarker of epileptic brain tissue and may also be useful for seizure forecasting. Despite such clinical utility of HFOs, the spatial context and neuronal activity underlying these local field potential (LFP) events remains unclear. We sought to further understand the neuronal correlates of ictal high frequency LFPs using multielectrode array recordings in the human neocortex and mesial temporal lobe during rhythmic onset seizures. These multiscale recordings capture single cell, multiunit, and LFP activity from the human brain. We compare features of multiunit firing and high frequency LFP from microelectrodes and macroelectrodes during ictal discharges in both the seizure core and penumbra (spatial seizure domains defined by multiunit activity patterns). We report differences in spectral features, unit-local field potential coupling, and information theoretic characteristics of high frequency LFP before and after local seizure invasion. Furthermore, we tie these time-domain differences to spatial domains of seizures, showing that penumbral discharges are more broadly distributed and less useful for seizure localization. These results describe the neuronal and synaptic correlates of two types of pathological HFOs in humans and have important implications for clinical interpretation of rhythmic onset seizures.

Broadband high-frequency activity (BHA; 70 to 150 Hz), also known as "high gamma," a key analytic signal in human intracranial (electrocorticographic) recordings, is often assumed to reflect local neural firing [multiunit activity (MUA)]. As the precise physiological substrates of BHA are unknown, this assumption remains controversial. Our analysis of laminar multielectrode data from V1 and A1 in monkeys outlines two components of stimulus-evoked BHA distributed across the cortical layers: an "early-deep" and "late-superficial" response. Early-deep BHA has a clear spatial and temporal overlap with MUA. Late-superficial BHA was more prominent and accounted for more of the BHA signal measured near the cortical pial surface. However, its association with local MUA is weak and often undetectable, consistent with the view that it reflects dendritic processes separable from local neuronal firing.

To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing (PP) must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.