Faculty Bibliography

The creation of auditory threat Pavlovian memory requires an initial learning stage in which a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS), such as a tone, is paired with an aversive one (US), such as a shock. In this phase, the CS acquires the capacity of predicting the occurrence of the US and therefore elicits conditioned defense responses. Norepinephrine (NE), through beta-adrenergic receptors in the amygdala, enhances threat memory by facilitating the acquisition of the CS-US association, but the nature of this effect has not been described. Here we show that NE release, induced by the footshock of the first conditioning trial, promotes the subsequent enhancement of learning. Consequently, blocking NE transmission disrupts multitrial but not one-trial conditioning. We further found that increasing the time between the conditioning trials eliminates the amplificatory effect of NE. Similarly, an unsignaled footshock delivered in a separate context immediately before conditioning can enhance learning. These results help define the conditions under which NE should and should not be expected to alter threat processing and fill an important gap in the understanding of the neural processes relevant to the pathophysiology of stress and anxiety disorders.

Patients with anxiety disorders often experience a relapse in symptoms after exposure therapy. Similarly, threat responses acquired during Pavlovian threat conditioning often return after extinction learning. Accordingly, there is a need for alternative methods to persistently reduce threat responding. Studies in rodents have suggested that exercising behavioral control over an aversive stimulus can persistently diminish threat responses, and that these effects are mediated by the amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and striatum. In this fMRI study, we attempted to translate these findings to humans. Subjects first underwent threat conditioning. We then contrasted two forms of safety learning: active avoidance, in which participants could prevent the shock through an action, and yoked extinction, with shock presentation matched to the active condition, but without instrumental control. The following day, we assessed subjects' threat responses (measured by skin conductance) to the conditioned stimuli without shock. Subjects next underwent threat conditioning with novel stimuli. Yoked extinction subjects showed an increase in conditioned response to stimuli from the previous day, but the active avoidance group did not. Additionally, active avoidance subjects showed reduced conditioned responding during novel threat conditioning, but the extinction group did not. We observed between-group differences in striatal BOLD responses to shock omission in Avoidance/Extinction. These findings suggest a differential role for the striatum in human active avoidance versus extinction learning, and indicate that active avoidance may be more effective than extinction in persistently diminishing threat responses.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Extinguished threat responses often reemerge with time, highlighting the importance of identifying more enduring means of attenuation. We compared the effects of active avoidance learning and yoked extinction on threat responses in humans and contrasted the neural circuitry engaged by these two processes. Subjects who learned to prevent a shock through an action maintained low threat responses after safety learning and showed attenuated threat conditioning with novel stimuli, in contrast to those who underwent yoked extinction. The results suggest that experiences of active control over threat engage the striatum and promote a shift from expression of innate defensive responses toward more adaptive behavioral responses to threatening stimuli.

When subjective state words are used to describe behaviors, or brain circuits that control them nonconsciously, the behaviors and circuits take on properties of the subjective state. Research on fear illustrates the problems that can result. Subjective state words should be limited to the description of inner experiences, and avoided when referring to circuits underlying nonsubjectively controlled behaviors.

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

Memory formation requires the temporal coordination of molecular events and cellular processes following a learned event. During Pavlovian threat (fear) conditioning (PTC), sensory and neuromodulatory inputs converge on post-synaptic neurons within the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA). By activating an intracellular cascade of signaling molecules, these G-protein-coupled neuromodulatory receptors are capable of recruiting a diverse profile of plasticity-related proteins. Here we report that norepinephrine, through its actions on beta-adrenergic receptors (betaARs), modulates aversive memory formation following PTC through two molecularly and temporally distinct signaling mechanisms. Specifically, using behavioral pharmacology and biochemistry in adult rats, we determined that betaAR activity during, but not after PTC training initiates the activation of two plasticity-related targets: AMPA receptors (AMPARs) for memory acquisition and short-term memory and extracellular regulated kinase (ERK) for consolidating the learned association into a long-term memory. These findings reveal that betaAR activity during, but not following PTC sets in motion cascading molecular events for the acquisition (AMPARs) and subsequent consolidation (ERK) of learned associations.Neuropsychopharmacology accepted article preview online, 20 October 2016. doi:10.1038/npp.2016.238.

The updating of a memory is triggered whenever it is reactivated and a mismatch from what is expected (i.e., prediction error) is detected, a process that can be unraveled through the memory's sensitivity to protein synthesis inhibitors (i.e., reconsolidation). As noted in previous studies, in Pavlovian threat/aversive conditioning in adult rats, prediction error detection and its associated protein synthesis-dependent reconsolidation can be triggered by reactivating the memory with the conditioned stimulus (CS), but without the unconditioned stimulus (US), or by presenting a CS-US pairing with a different CS-US interval than during the initial learning. Whether similar mechanisms underlie memory updating in the young is not known. Using similar paradigms with rapamycin (an mTORC1 inhibitor), we show that preweaning rats (PN18-20) do form a long-term memory of the CS-US interval, and detect a 10-sec versus 30-sec temporal prediction error. However, the resulting updating/reconsolidation processes become adult-like after adolescence (PN30-40). Our results thus show that while temporal prediction error detection exists in preweaning rats, specific infant-type mechanisms are at play for associative learning and memory.

Translation in dendrites is believed to support synaptic changes during memory consolidation. Although translational control mechanisms are fundamental mediators of memory, little is known about their role in local translation. We previously found that polyribosomes accumulate in dendritic spines of the adult rat lateral amygdala (LA) during consolidation of aversive pavlovian conditioning and that this memory requires cap-dependent initiation, a primary point of translational control in eukaryotic cells. Here we used serial electron microscopy reconstructions to quantify polyribosomes in LA dendrites when consolidation was blocked by the cap-dependent initiation inhibitor 4EGI-1. We found that 4EGI-1 depleted polyribosomes in dendritic shafts and selectively prevented their upregulation in spine heads, but not bases and necks, during consolidation. Cap-independent upregulation was specific to spines with small, astrocyte-associated synapses. Our results reveal that cap-dependent initiation is involved in local translation during learning and that local translational control varies with synapse type.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Translation initiation is a central regulator of long-term memory formation. Local translation in dendrites supports memory by providing necessary proteins at synaptic sites, but it is unknown whether this requires initiation or bypasses it. We used serial electron microscopy reconstructions to examine polyribosomes in dendrites when memory formation was blocked by an inhibitor of translation initiation. This revealed two major pools of polyribosomes that were upregulated during memory formation: one pool in dendritic spine heads that was initiation dependent and another pool in the bases and necks of small spines that was initiation independent. Thus, translation regulation differs between spine types and locations, and translation that occurs closest to individual synapses during memory formation is initiation dependent.

Pavlovian aversive conditioning requires learning of the association between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned, aversive stimulus (US) but also involves encoding the time interval between the two stimuli. The neurobiological bases of this time interval learning are unknown. Here, we show that in rats, the dorsal striatum and basal amygdala belong to a common functional network underlying temporal expectancy and learning of a CS-US interval. Importantly, changes in coherence between striatum and amygdala local field potentials (LFPs) were found to couple these structures during interval estimation within the lower range of the theta rhythm (3-6 Hz). Strikingly, we also show that a change to the CS-US time interval results in long-term changes in cortico-striatal synaptic efficacy under the control of the amygdala. Collectively, this study reveals physiological correlates of plasticity mechanisms of interval timing that take place in the striatum and are regulated by the amygdala.

Distinguishing threatening from nonthreatening stimuli is essential for survival and stimulus generalization is a hallmark of anxiety disorders. While auditory threat learning produces long-lasting plasticity in primary auditory cortex (Au1), it is not clear whether such Au1 plasticity regulates memory specificity or generalization. We used muscimol infusions in rats to show that discriminatory threat learning requires Au1 activity specifically during memory acquisition and retrieval, but not during consolidation. Memory specificity was similarly disrupted by infusion of PKMζ inhibitor peptide (ZIP) during memory storage. Our findings show that Au1 is required at critical memory phases and suggest that Au1 plasticity enables stimulus discrimination.

Research on avoidance conditioning began in the late 1930s as a way to use laboratory experiments to better understand uncontrollable fear and anxiety. Avoidance was initially conceived of as a two-factor learning process in which fear is first acquired through Pavlovian aversive conditioning (so-called fear conditioning), and then behaviors that reduce the fear aroused by the Pavlovian conditioned stimulus are reinforced through instrumental conditioning. Over the years, criticisms of both the avoidance paradigm and the two-factor fear theory arose. By the mid-1980s, avoidance had fallen out of favor as an experimental model relevant to fear and anxiety. However, recent progress in understanding the neural basis of Pavlovian conditioning has stimulated a new wave of research on avoidance. This new work has fostered new insights into contributions of not only Pavlovian and instrumental learning but also habit learning, to avoidance, and has suggested that the reinforcing event underlying the instrumental phase should be conceived in terms of cellular and molecular events in specific circuits rather than in terms of vague notions of fear reduction. In our approach, defensive reactions (freezing), actions (avoidance) and habits (habitual avoidance) are viewed as being controlled by unique circuits that operate nonconsciously in the control of behavior, and that are distinct from the circuits that give rise to conscious feelings of fear and anxiety. These refinements, we suggest, overcome older criticisms, justifying the value of the new wave of research on avoidance, and offering a fresh perspective on the clinical implications of this work.