Faculty Bibliography

Classic change blindness is the phenomenon where seemingly obvious changes that coincide with visual disruptions (such as blinks or brief blanks) go unnoticed by an attentive observer. Some early work into the causes of classic change blindness suggested that any pre-change stimulus representation is overwritten by a representation of the altered post-change stimulus, preventing change detection. However, recent work revealed that, even when observers do maintain memory representations of both the pre- and post-change stimulus states, they can still miss the change, suggesting that change blindness can also arise from a failure to compare the stored representations. Here, we studied slow change blindness, a related phenomenon that occurs even in the absence of visual disruptions when the change occurs sufficiently slowly, to determine whether it could be explained by conclusions from classic change blindness. Across three different slow change blindness experiments we found that observers who consistently failed to notice the change had access to at least two memory representations of the changing display. One representation was precise but short lived: a detailed representation of the more recent stimulus states, but fragile. The other representation lasted longer but was fairly general: stable but too coarse to differentiate the various stages of the change. These findings suggest that, although multiple representations are formed, the failure to compare hypotheses might not explain slow change blindness; even if a comparison were made, the representations would be too sparse (longer term stores) or too fragile (short-lived stores) for such comparison to inform about the change.

Sensory inputs enter a constantly active brain, whose state is always changing from one moment to the next. Currently, little is known about how ongoing, spontaneous brain activity participates in online task processing. We employed 7 Tesla fMRI and a threshold-level visual perception task to probe the effects of prestimulus ongoing brain activity on perceptual decision-making and conscious recognition. Prestimulus activity originating from distributed brain regions, including visual cortices and regions of the default-mode and cingulo-opercular networks, exerted a diverse set of effects on the sensitivity and criterion of conscious recognition, and categorization performance. We further elucidate the mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects, revealing how prestimulus activity modulates multiple aspects of stimulus processing in highly specific and network-dependent manners. These findings reveal heretofore unknown network mechanisms underlying ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious perception, and may hold implications for understanding the precise roles of spontaneous activity in other brain functions.

Consciousness science is experiencing a coming-of-age moment. Following 3 decades of sustained efforts by a relatively small group of consciousness researchers, the field has seen exponential growth over the past 5 years. It is increasingly recognized that although the investigation of subjective experiences is a difficult task, modern neuroscience need not and cannot shy away from the challenge of peeling away the mysteries of conscious experiences. In June 2023, with the joint support of the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the U.S. National Science Foundation, a 3-day workshop was held at the Bethesda, MD, campus of the National Institutes of Health, convening experts whose work focuses primarily on problems of consciousness, or an adjacent field, to discuss the current state of consciousness science and consider the most fruitful avenues for future research. This Special Focus features empirical and theoretical contributions from some of the invited speakers at the workshop. Here, I will cover the scope of the workshop, the content of this Special Focus, and advocate for stronger bridges between consciousness science and other subdisciplines of cognitive neuroscience.

Humans spend hours each day spontaneously engaging with visual content, free from specific tasks and at their own pace. Currently, the brain mechanisms determining the duration of self-paced perceptual behavior remain largely unknown. Here, participants viewed naturalistic images under task-free settings and self-paced each image's viewing duration while undergoing EEG and pupillometry recordings. Across two independent data sets, we observed large inter- and intra-individual variability in viewing duration. However, beyond an image's presentation order and category, specific image content had no consistent effects on spontaneous viewing duration across participants. Overall, longer viewing durations were associated with sustained enhanced posterior positivity and anterior negativity in the ERPs. Individual-specific variations in the spontaneous viewing duration were consistently correlated with evoked EEG activity amplitudes and pupil size changes. By contrast, presentation order was selectively correlated with baseline alpha power and baseline pupil size. Critically, spontaneous viewing duration was strongly predicted by the temporal stability in neural activity patterns starting as early as 350 msec after image onset, suggesting that early neural stability is a key predictor for sustained perceptual engagement. Interestingly, neither bottom-up nor top-down predictions about image category influenced spontaneous viewing duration. Overall, these results suggest that individual-specific factors can influence perceptual processing at a surprisingly early time point and influence the multifaceted ebb and flow of spontaneous human perceptual behavior in naturalistic settings.

Change blindness is the phenomenon that occurs when an observer fails to notice what would seem to be obvious changes in the features of a visual stimulus. Researchers can induce this experimentally by including visual disruptions (such as brief blanks) that coincide with the changes in question. However, change blindness can also occur in the absence of these disruptions if a change occurs sufficiently slowly. This "slow" or "gradual" change blindness phenomenon has not been extensively researched. Two plausible practical reasons for this are that there are few slow-change stimuli available, and that it is difficult to collect trial-specific responses without affecting expectations on later trials. Here, we describe a novel, semi-automatic procedure for quickly generating many slow-change stimuli. This procedure creates stimuli that have been specifically designed to allow assessment of change blindness on individual trials without influencing subsequent trials. We include the results of three validation experiments that demonstrate that these stimuli are effective and suitable for use in systematic studies of slow change blindness.

Consciousness science has matured over the past three decades and is currently on the cusp of explosive growth, with the potential to transform medicine and technology. The global community recently met to synthesize the current state of knowledge and define the most exciting approaches to advance the field.

While there is a wealth of knowledge about core object recognition-our ability to recognize clear, high-contrast object images-how the brain accomplishes object recognition tasks under increased uncertainty remains poorly understood. We investigated the spatiotemporal neural dynamics underlying object recognition under increased uncertainty by combining MEG and 7 Tesla (7T) fMRI in humans during a threshold-level object recognition task. We observed an early, parallel rise of recognition-related signals across ventral visual and frontoparietal regions that preceded the emergence of category-related information. Recognition-related signals in ventral visual regions were best explained by a two-state representational format whereby brain activity bifurcated for recognized and unrecognized images. By contrast, recognition-related signals in frontoparietal regions exhibited a reduced representational space for recognized images, yet with sharper category information. These results provide a spatiotemporally resolved view of neural activity supporting object recognition under uncertainty, revealing a pattern distinct from that underlying core object recognition.

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.

In the natural environment, we often form stable perceptual experiences from ambiguous and fleeting sensory inputs. Which neural activity underlies the content of perception and which neural activity supports perceptual stability remains an open question. We used a bistable perception paradigm involving ambiguous images to behaviorally dissociate perceptual content from perceptual stability, and magnetoencephalography to measure whole-brain neural dynamics in humans. Combining multivariate decoding and neural state-space analyses, we found frequency-band-specific neural signatures that underlie the content of perception and promote perceptual stability, respectively. Across different types of images, non-oscillatory neural activity in the slow cortical potential (<5 Hz) range supported the content of perception. Perceptual stability was additionally influenced by the amplitude of alpha and beta oscillations. In addition, neural activity underlying perceptual memory, which supports perceptual stability when sensory input is temporally removed from view, also encodes elapsed time. Together, these results reveal distinct neural mechanisms that support the content versus stability of visual perception.

Ambiguous images elicit bistable perception, wherein periods of momentary perceptual stability are interrupted by sudden perceptual switches. When intermittently presented, ambiguous images trigger a perceptual memory trace in the intervening blank periods. Understanding the neural bases of perceptual stability and perceptual memory during bistable perception may hold clues for explaining the apparent stability of visual experience in the natural world, where ambiguous and fleeting images are prevalent. Motivated by recent work showing the involvement of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) in bistable perception, we conducted a transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) study with a double-blind, within-subject cross-over design to test a potential causal role of rIFG in these processes. Subjects viewed ambiguous images presented continuously or intermittently while under EEG recording. We did not find any significant tDCS effect on perceptual behavior. However, the fluctuations of oscillatory power in the alpha and beta bands predicted perceptual stability, with higher power corresponding to longer percept durations. In addition, higher alpha and beta power predicted enhanced perceptual memory during intermittent viewing. These results reveal a unified neurophysiological mechanism sustaining perceptual stability and perceptual memory when the visual system is faced with ambiguous input.