Faculty Bibliography

Normalization is a widespread neural computation in both early sensory coding and higher-order processes such as attention and multisensory integration. It has been shown that during decision-making, normalization implements a context-dependent value code in parietal cortex. In this paper we develop a simple differential equations model based on presumed neural circuitry that implements normalization at equilibrium and predicts specific time-varying properties of value coding. Moreover, we show that when parameters representing value are changed, the solution curves change in a manner consistent with normalization theory and experiment. We show that these dynamic normalization models naturally implement a time-discounted normalization over past activity, implying an intrinsic reference-dependence in value coding of a kind seen experimentally. These results suggest that a single network mechanism can explain transient and sustained decision activity, reference dependence through time discounting, and hence emphasizes the importance of a dynamic rather than static view of divisive normalization in neural coding

Applying past knowledge to future actions is crucial for adaptive choice behavior. Here, in this issue of Neuron, Donahue et al. (2013) show that reward enhances neural coding reliability for actions in a network of frontal and parietal brain areas.

Experimental economic techniques have been widely used to evaluate human risk attitudes, but how these measured attitudes relate to overall individual wealth levels is unclear. Previous noneconomic work has addressed this uncertainty in animals by asking the following: (i) Do our close evolutionary relatives share both our risk attitudes and our degree of economic rationality? And (ii) how does the amount of food or water one holds (a nonpecuniary form of "wealth") alter risk attitudes in these choosers? Unfortunately, existing noneconomic studies have provided conflicting insights from an economic point of view. We therefore used standard techniques from human experimental economics to measure monkey risk attitudes for water rewards as a function of blood osmolality (an objective measure of how much water the subjects possess). Early in training, monkeys behaved randomly, consistently violating first-order stochastic dominance and monotonicity. After training, they behaved like human choosers-technically consistent in their choices and weakly risk averse (i.e., risk averse or risk neutral on average)-suggesting that well-trained monkeys can serve as a model for human choice behavior. As with attitudes about money in humans, these risk attitudes were strongly wealth dependent; as the animals became "poorer," risk aversion increased, a finding incompatible with some models of wealth and risk in human decision making.

Understanding the neural code is critical to linking brain and behavior. In sensory systems, divisive normalization seems to be a canonical neural computation, observed in areas ranging from retina to cortex and mediating processes including contrast adaptation, surround suppression, visual attention, and multisensory integration. Recent electrophysiological studies have extended these insights beyond the sensory domain, demonstrating an analogous algorithm for the value signals that guide decision making, but the effects of normalization on choice behavior are unknown. Here, we show that choice models using normalization generate significant (and classically irrational) choice phenomena driven by either the value or number of alternative options. In value-guided choice experiments, both monkey and human choosers show novel context-dependent behavior consistent with normalization. These findings suggest that the neural mechanism of value coding critically influences stochastic choice behavior and provide a generalizable quantitative framework for examining context effects in decision making.

To survive in a dynamic environment, an organism must be able to effectively learn, store, and recall the expected benefits and costs of potential actions. The nature of the valuation and decision processes is thus of fundamental interest to researchers at the intersection of psychology, neuroscience, and economics. Although normative theories of choice have outlined the theoretical structure of these valuations, recent experiments have begun to reveal how value is instantiated in the activity of neurons and neural circuits. Here, we review the various forms of value coding that have been observed in different brain systems and examine the implications of these value representations for both neural circuits and behavior. In particular, we focus on emerging evidence that value coding in a number of brain areas is context dependent, varying as a function of both the current choice set and previously experienced values. Similar contextual modulation occurs widely in the sensory system, and efficient coding principles derived in the sensory domain suggest a new framework for understanding the neural coding of value.

The representation of value is a critical component of decision making. Rational choice theory assumes that options are assigned absolute values, independent of the value or existence of other alternatives. However, context-dependent choice behavior in both animals and humans violates this assumption, suggesting that biological decision processes rely on comparative evaluation. Here we show that neurons in the monkey lateral intraparietal cortex encode a relative form of saccadic value, explicitly dependent on the values of the other available alternatives. Analogous to extra-classical receptive field effects in visual cortex, this relative representation incorporates target values outside the response field and is observed in both stimulus-driven activity and baseline firing rates. This context-dependent modulation is precisely described by divisive normalization, indicating that this standard form of sensory gain control may be a general mechanism of cortical computation. Such normalization in decision circuits effectively implements an adaptive gain control for value coding and provides a possible mechanistic basis for behavioral context-dependent violations of rationality.